Abstract: Recently, a hierarchy of probabilistic complexity classes generalizing N Phas emerged in the work of Babai B], and Goldwasser, Micali, and Racko GMR1], and Goldwasser and Sipser GS]. The class I Pis de ned through the computational model of an interactive prover-veri er pair. Both Turing machines in a pair receive a common input and exchange messages. Every move of the veri er as well as its nal determination of whether to accept or reject w are the result of random polynomial time computations on the input and all messages sent so far. The prover has no resource bounds. A language, L, is in I Pif there is a prover-veri er pair such that: 1.) when w 2 L, the veri er accepts with probability at least 1 ; 2 ;jwj and, 2.) when w 6 2 L, the veri er interacting with any prover accepts with probability a t most 2 ;jwj . Such a prover-veri er pair is called an interactive proof for L.
Introduction
The class N Phas traditionally been recognized to capture the notion of e cient provability, containing those languages for which there exist polynomial length proofs of membership which can be veri ed in polynomial time. Recently, a hierarchy of probabilistic complexity classes generalizing this notion of e cient provability has emerged in the work of Babai B] , and Goldwasser, Micali, and Racko GMR1] , and Goldwasser and Sipser GS] . The class I Pis de ned through the * Supported by an ONR fellowship and partially supported by NSF grant DCR-8509905. ** Supported by a n I B M P ost Doctoral Fellowship and partially supported by Air Force Contract AFOSR-86-0078. Currently at the Royal Institute of Technology. 1 computational model of an interactive prover-veri er pair. Both Turing machines in a pair receive a common input, w, and exchange up to a polynomial in jwj numberof messages, each of which has length at most a polynomial in jwj. The veri er's moves and its nal determination of whether to accept or reject w result from random polynomial time computations on w and all messages sent so far. The prover has no resource bounds. A language, L, is in I P f(n)] if there exists an interactive prover-veri er pair that on input w exchanges at most f(jwj) messages such that: 1.) when w 2 L, the veri er interacting with the prover accepts with probability at least 1;2 ;jwj and, 2.) when w 6 2 L, the veri er interacting with any prover accepts with probability at most 2 ;jwj . Such a p r o ver-veri er pair is called an interactive proof for L. Let I P= k I P n k ]. Just as in the case when L 2 N P , when L 2 I P , membership in L is e ciently veri able since the veri er runs in polynomial time and determines membership correctly with probability v ery close to one. However, I Pis thought to strictly contain N P since several languages which h a ve resisted all attempts to be placed in N P have been shown to be in I P , for example, Graph Non-Isomorphism GMW], Matrix Group Non-Membership, and Matrix Group Order B] .
In addition to de ning interactive proofs, Goldwasser, Micali, and Racko GMR1] further de ned zero-knowledge interactive proofs. The zero-knowledge de nition was motivated by cryptographic considerations. (For motivation and applications of zero-knowledge see for example GMR2] and GMW].) Informally, a prover is zero-knowledge for a language if the prover reveals no useful information (other than language membership) when interacting with any veri er. Slightly more formally, a prover is zero-knowledge for L if for any veri er there is a probabilistic polynomial time simulator that, on inputs in L, produces conversations with the \same" probability distribution as the prover interacting with that veri er. Actually, three interpretations of \same" lead to three types of zero-knowledge, each more restrictive than the next. When \same" is informally interpreted as: 1.) identical, 2.) almost identical, or 3.) equivalent with respect to probabilistic polynomial time, then the prover is said to be perfect zero-knowledge, statistical zero-knowledge, or computational zero-knowledge for L, respectively. A language, L, is in P Z K (SZK, C Z K ) if there is an interacting prover-veri er pair which is a interactive proof for L with the additional property that the prover is perfect (statistical, computational) zero-knowledge for L.
Requiring that, for inputs in the language, the conversations between the prover and every veri er be accurately reproducible by some random polynomial time machine would seem to bea severe constraint on the power of the prover and hence the power of the zero-knowledge model. Surprisingly, for computational zero-knowledge this is probably not the case. Through the work of GMW], BGGHKMR], IY] it has been shown that, assuming secure encryption exists, any interactive proof can be transformed into a computational zero-knowledge proof, i.e., C Z K= I P . Fortnow F] was the rst to provide evidence that the statistical zero-knowledge requirement may restrict the power of the prover. He proved that if a language has a statistical zero-knowledge proof, then the complement of the language has a bounded round interactive proof, i.e., SZK co-I P 2]. From this theorem we can deduce that it is unlikely that SZKcontains all of N Psince if N P SZKthen co-N P I P 2], which further implies that the polynomial time hierarchy collapses to I P 2] by BHZ]. This is especially interesting because it implies that membership in SZKcan be taken as evidence that a language is not N Pcomplete. A particularly important example of this is Graph Isomorphism, which w as shown to be in SZKby GMW]. While Fortnow's result did imply that SZKis probably weaker than I P(I Pcontains N P whereas SZKprobably does not), it still left open the possibility t h a t SZKcontained languages 2 in I Pwhich required a polynomial numberofinteractions. In this paper we s h o w that this cannot bethe case. We prove that any language which is recognized by an unbounded round statistical zero-knowledge proof can also be recognized by a t wo round interactive proof, i.e., SZK I P 2]. Hence, under the assumption that I P6 = I P 2], the statistical zero-knowledge condition on the prover severely restricts the power of unbounded round interactive proofs. Our result does not depend on any u n p r o ven cryptographic assumptions.
We should note that, due to the fact that our proof techniques relativize, it is undoubtedly not possible to strengthen our result to get C Z K I P 2]. Such a result would imply that I P 2] = I P if secure encryption functions exist (since C Z K= I Punder the same assumption, as stated above). However, Aiello, Goldwasser, and Hastad AGH] have separated I P 2] and I Pwith an oracle. We strongly believe that their construction can be modi ed to incorporate the existence of a oneway permutation. Hence, relative to such an oracle, C Z K6 I P 2] implying that no proof of containment can relativize.
The outline of the paper is as follows: In section 2 we give the basic de nitions that are needed in the paper. We give t h e i n tuition behind the proof in section 3. In section 4 we recall some facts about estimating sizes of sets using interactive proofs and in section 5 we state and prove the main theorem.
Notation and De nitions
In this section we give the formal de nitions needed for the paper. Let P denote a prover:
any probabilistic Turing machine which has a \communication" tape (for a formal de nition of a \communication" tape see GMR1]). P has no resource bounds. Let V denote a veri er: any probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine with a communication tape. Let P $ V denote an interacting prover-veri er pair: any prover and veri er which share the same input tape and communication tape (initially empty) and interact in rounds in the following way.
(1) The veri er, V , makes a probabilistic polynomial time computation based on the input, the contents of its memory, and all messages thus far received over the communication tape from the prover, P.
(2) V transmits the result of the computation over the communication tape to P. We will denote the message sent b y V in round i by x 2i;1 . (3) P performs a probabilistic computation based on the input, and all messages thus far received over the communication tape from V . (4) P transmits the result of the computation over the communication tape to V . We will denote the message sent b y P in round i by y 2i .
The number of rounds is at most a polynomial in the input length and the interaction is terminated by t h e v eri er accepting or rejecting.
Let P$V (w) denote a transcript of the interaction between the prover and the veri er. This is of course a stochastic variable depending on P's and V 's random choices.
De nition: A given P$V is -complete for a language, L, if for all w 2 L the probability that V accepts on w is at least .
De nition: A v eri er, V is -sound for a language, L, if for all P 0 $V and all w = 2 L the probability that V rejects on w is at least . GMR1] de ned the class I Pas follows. L is in I P f(n)] if there exists an interacting proververi er pair, P$V , that exchanges at most f(n) messages (n being the length of the input) such that:
1.) P$V is (1 ; 2 ;n )-complete for L, and 2.) V is (1 ; 2 ;n )-sound for L. Call such a P$V an interactive proof for L. Note that membership in L is still e ciently veri able since V runs in polynomial time and veri es membership correctly with probability v ery close to one. De ne I Pas the union over k of I P n k ].
We should make s e v eral remarks here. First, we can assume without loss of generality that all messages sent by P and V are of the same length, l(n), and all conversations consist of the same number of messages, d(n), where l and d are polynomials and n is the length of the input. Second, any language, L, which has an interactive prover-veri er pair, P$V , such that P$V is ( + )-sound for L also has an interactive proof, P 0 $V 0 , for L. P 0 $V 0 just simulates P$V a polynomial number of times (depending on ) and V 0 accepts if V accepted in a majority of the simulations. Third, it is easy to see that replacing the (1 ; 2 ;n )-soundness condition with a 1-soundness condition collapses I Pdown to N P . It is not as easy to see that requiring 1-completeness does not a ect the power of the model. The proof of this fact was given by Goldreich, Mansour, and Sipser GMS].
Zero-Knowledge
In this section we will give the formal de nition of a zero-knowledge interactive proof for a language. We will rst need some properties of probability distributions on strings.
Let A(w) a n d B(w) where P C A(w) y denotes the probability that C outputs 1 on input y when y is chosen according to A(w), and P C B(w) y is de ned similarly with respect to B(w).
We h a ve already seen what it means for an interacting prover-veri er pair to be an interactive proof for a language. In a cryptographic setting, however, we m a y require more from our protocol than just completeness and soundness. We m a y w ant the prover to give nothing to the veri er that the veri er could not have computed itself. To formalize this GMR1] introduced the important de nition of zero-knowledge. We need the weakest form of zero-knowledge so let us start by introducing it.
The key concept for zero-knowledge is that of a simulator. A simulator, M, is a random Turing machine that produces strings, i.e., \conversations," in expected polynomial time. Let M(w) be the random variable associated with M on input w. Recall that P$V (w) is the random variable associated with the conversations produced by P $V on input w. We will say that P is perfect zero-knowledge for V on L if there exists a simulator, M, such t h a t M L] P P$V L]. De ne the class T V P Z K , Trusted Veri er Perfect Zero-Knowledge, to be those languages, L, for which there exists an interactive prover-veri er pair, P$V , such that: 1.) P$V is (1 ; 2 ;n )-complete on L, 2.) V is (1 ; 2 ;n )-sound on L, a n d 3.) P is perfect zero-knowledge for V on L. Call such a P$V a trusted veri er perfect zero-knowledge proof for L.
We can also de ne Trusted Veri er Statistical Zero-Knowledge, T V S Z K , a n d T rusted Veri er Computational Zero-Knowledge, T VC Z K . P is statistical (computational) zero-knowledge for V on L if for all k there exists a simulator, M, and an integer, N,
s e languages, L, for which there exists an interactive prover-veri er pair, P$V , such that: 1.) P$V is (1 ; 2 ;n )-complete on L, 2.) V is (1 ; 2 ;n )-sound on L, a n d 3.) P is statistical (computational) zero-knowledge for V on L. Call such a P $V a trusted veri er statistical (computational) zero-knowledge proof for L. Although we have no results for computation zero-knowledge, we g i v e that de nition for the sake of completeness so the reader can compare the di erent de nitions.
Besides requiring that a pair, P$V , be a trusted veri er zero-knowledge proof for a language, in a cryptographic setting we may require even more. For example, P cannot besure that it is interacting with V , the veri er of the interactive proof. P may b e i n teracting with a another veri er, V 0 , w h i c h b y deviating from the protocol can extract additional \knowledge" from P. This leads to the normal, more restrictive, de nition of zero-knowledge where no veri er should be able to gain any additional \knowledge" from P. However since our proof already works for the less restrictive notion of zero-knowledge we will not need the more restrictive de nitions and hence we refer the interested reader to GMR1] and to GMR2], O] and TW] for a discussion of the de nitions. Fortnow F] proved that if L admits a polynomial round proof which is perfect or statistical zero-knowledge for a trusted veri er then the complement o f L is in I P 2]. Our main result is that under the same assumption, L itself is in I P 2].
We will prove the main theorem in section 5. The proof is quite technical and hence we will give a n i n tuitive o verview of the proof in the next section.
3. Outline of Proof Structure of Simulator
For the time being let us consider languages in T V P Z K . Let L be such a language, let P$V betheinteractive proof recognizing L, and let M be the perfect zero-knowledge simulator for P$V , i.e., P $V L] P M L]. Further assume that M runs in polynomial time rather than expected polynomial time. Our goal is to show that L can also be recognized by a bounded round interactive proof. Alice, or A, will be the prover in the bounded round proof and Bob, or B, will be the veri er. In conversations produced by the simulator, M, we will say that the prover-moves in the conversation are produced by a virtual prover, P 0 , and the veri er-moves are produced by a virtual veri er, V 0 . We will often write this as M = P 0 $V 0 where the 0 indicates that P 0 $V 0 is not a true interactive prover-veri er pair. To summarize, L is recognized by P$V M is the zero-knowledge simulator which w e think of as P 0 $V 0 and our goal is to construct a bounded round proof, A$B, that also recognizes L.
Recall that V 's moves are labeled x and P's moves are labeled y. Let s k be the string produced by the rst k interactions of the P $V protocol, s k = x 1 y 2 : : : q k where q k = x k for k oddor y k for k even. Without loss of generality assume that V sends its coins to P on the very last move. Let d(n) + 1 be the total numberofinteractions where d(n) i s e v en. We will abbreviate the entire dialogue, s d(n) r , a s s r. Recall that P$V (w) is a random variable. We will often be interested in the event that the entire conversation is s r, i.e., that P$V (w) = s r. In addition, we will also be interested in the event that the rst k interactions are s k and V has coins r. This event is written as P $V (w) = s k r . Finally, we will also beinterested in the event P $V (w) = s k , i.e., the rst k interactions yield s k . We will use similar notation to signify the same events for M(w).
Recall that the veri er's j + 1st move is a function of the input, its random bits and the previous 2j interactions. We denote this formally as V (w r s 2j ) = x 2j+1 for 0 2j < d (n).
De nition: A conversation, s r, output by the simulator is valid if the moves of V 0 are the same as the the moves that the real V would make i f i t w ere playing with coins r. That is s r is valid if V (w r s 2j ) = x 2j+1 for 0 2j < d (n).
Let us look at the behavior of M on input w. By de nition of perfect zero-knowledge, when w 2 L the conversations of P$V and P 0 $V 0 have the same distribution. Hence, M will output valid conversations with probability one and output accepting conversations with probability at least 1 ; 2 ;n . Also, the moves of P 0 must be made with the same probabilities as the moves of P.
This will be made more formal later.
When w = 2 L there are two cases. Either M outputs valid accepting conversations with high probability or it does not. The latter case immediately implies that w = 2 L. Let us look at the former case more closely. By de nition of an interactive proof, if w = 2 L then for all provers, Q, the probability that Q$V accepts is at most 2 ;n . But P 0 convinces V 0 to accept with high probability. P 0 can gain such an advantage over any real prover, Q, since P 0 can \see" r of V 0 (since P 0 $V 0 is actually one machine, M, b y de nition) whereas Q can only infer certain properties of V 's coins given the conversation so far.
Having discerned the gross behavior of M on input w we can give a v ery broad outline of the interactive proof between Alice and Bob, A$B. On input w (1) Bob will try to convince himself that M(w) outputs valid accepting conversations with high probability, and (2) Alice will try to convince Bob that P 0 is not taking advantage of the fact that P 0 \sees" the coins of V 0 . Bob will accept w only if he is convinced of both (1) and (2).
A broad outline of the proof that A$B recognizes L is as follows. When w 2 L, M(w) does output valid accepting conversations with high probability and so Bob will succeed in convincing himself in (1). Furthermore, P 0 makes moves with the same distribution as the real P and so Alice will succeed in convincing Bob in (2). When w = 2 L, if M does not output valid accepting conversations with high probability then Bob will not succeed in (1). If M does output valid accepting conversations with high probability then by the above discussion P 0 must be taking advantage of the fact that it \sees" r of V 0 . Hence, A will not succeed in (2).
Let us make the above discussion more formal. In order to simplify notation let us state once and for all that we will implicitely consider only nonempty sets or events with positive probability. It follows that all conditional probabilities are well de ned as are the logarithms of the size of sets.
De nition: Let s k be the set of all the veri er's coins that are consistent with the partial conversation s k . That is, s k is the set of all r such that V (w r s 2i ) = x 2i+1 for 0 2i < k .
Note that if the last move of s k is a veri er-move, i.e., k is odd,then s k = s k y for all y. This is due to the fact that the prover's move y does not a ect which coins are consistent with the veri er's moves in the string s k .
Observe that since V 's coins are uniformly distributed, for any partial conversation, s 2k;1 , all r that are consistent with s 2k;1 are equally likely. That is, P r P$V (w) = s 2k;1 r j P$V (w) = s 2k;1 ] = 1 j s 2k;1 j for all r 2 s 2k;1 and the probability is zero otherwise. Recall from above that s 2k;1 = s 2k;1 y . Hence P r P$V (w) = s 2k;1 y r j P$V (w) = s 2k;1 y ] = 1 j s 2k;1 j for all r 2 s 2k;1 and the probability is zero otherwise. The above identities imply that for all moves y of the prover P r P$V (w) = s 2k;1 y r j P$V (w) = s 2k;1 r ] = P r P$V (w) = s 2k;1 y j P$V (w) = s 2k;1 ] for all r 2 s 2k;1 . This motivates the following de nition: De nition: Given partial conversation s 2k;1 a m o ve y by P 0 is honest if P r P 0 $V 0 (w) = s 2k;1 y r j P 0 $V 0 (w) = s 2k;1 r ] = P r P 0 $V 0 (w) = s 2k;1 y j P 0 $V 0 (w) = s 2k;1 ] for all r 2 s 2k;1 . In words, a move y is honest if for all r the probability t h a t P 0 plays y given that s 2k;1 has been played so far and V 0 has coins r is equal to the probability t h a t P 0 's move i s y given only that the conversation thus far is s 2k;1 . That is, P 0 's move is based only on the conversation so far and not upon additional information about r. By de nition of P Z K , P r P 0 $V 0 = s r] = P r P$V = s r] for all s r when w 2 L. It follows that all of P 0 's moves are honest when w 2 L.
We will say that P 0 cheats on s 2k;1 y r if the rst conditional probability is much greater than the second. That is, P 0 cheats on move y if it does use additional information about r. For the sake of the analysis we will actually take the logarithms of the probabilities.
De nition: P 0 c-cheats on s 2k;1 y r if log (P r P 0 $V 0 (w) = s 2k;1 y r j P 0 $V 0 (w) = s 2k;1 r ]) log (P r P 0 $V 0 (w) = s 2k;1 y j P 0 $V 0 (w) = s 2k;1 ]) + c: When w = 2 L we will prove that if M(w) outputs valid accepting conversations with high probability then P 0 cheats a great deal on average. This will be made precise in Lemma 5.3.
The goal of the interactive proof between Alice and Bob is to distinguish between P 0 playing honestly everywhere and P 0 cheating a great deal on average. With Alice's help Bob will recognize when P 0 is honest and will accept. However, Alice will not be able to fool Bob into accepting very often when P 0 cheats a great d e a l o n a verage.
Remark:It is interesting to note that reason that the proof does not work for computational zero-knowledge is the the virtual prover cheats also in the case when w 2 L.
The probabilities used in the de nition of cheating are actually ratios of the sizes of certain sets, which w e now de ne. Let R bethe simulator's coin, jRj = q(n) where q(n) is a polynomial. Let s k and s k r be the sets of R for which M(w R) = s k or s k r respectively. With these de nitions, P 0 c-cheats on s 2k;1 y r if ; log j s 2k;1 y r j ; log j s 2k;1 r j ; ; log j s 2k;1 y j ; log j s 2k;1 j c:
The following section deals with the aforementioned subprotocols which p r o ve upper and lower bounds on the size of sets.
Upper and Lower Bound Protocols
Let us rst consider a subprotocol for proving lower bounds on the size of sets. It is based on a lemma of Sipser's S] and uses universal hashing CW].
Suppose C k where membership in C is testable in polynomial time. (The protocol can easily be modi ed to work when membership in C is testable in nondeterministic polynomial time but this will not concern us here.) Let H beak b Boolean matrix and let h: k ! b be de ned by m a t r i x m ultiplication modulo 2, h(x) = xH. The protocol \P proves jCj 2 b " is as follows:
1. V picks a random k b matrix H and a random element z of b . V sends H and z to P. Proof: Let us rst prove (1). Let S be the number of elements that map onto the randomly chosen z. S is a random variable and (S) = jCj2 ;b . Since if c 1 6 = c 2 the probability that h(c 1 ) = h(c 2 ) = z is 2 ;2b we h a ve that 2 (S) = jCj(2 ;b ;2 ;2b ). Using Chebychev's inequality this implies that P r S = 0 ] jCj(2 ;b ;2 ;2b ) (jCj2 ;b ) 2 2 b jCj . This implies (1) since whenever S 6 = 0 P can make V accept. (2) follows from the fact that for a xed element w 2 k the probability that h(w) = z for a xed h and a random z is 1=2 b .
Next we present a protocol developed by F ortnow F] for proving upper bounds on the size of sets. Suppose the veri er has a random element, c, of the set C k . It is crucial that P has no information about c other than the fact that it lies in C. De ne \P proves jCj 2 b " as follows.
1 Proof: The proof of (1) is as follows. P will certainly be able to answer with an a equal to c whenever none of the elements in C ; f cg collide with h(c) = z. This event occurs with probability at least 1 ; (jCj ; 1)=2 b since for a xed c and w in k , the probability t h a t h(w) = h(c) i s 1 =2 b . The proof of (2) 
Proof of Main Theorem
In this section we give the proof of our main theorem. Initially we will assume that the simulator is polynomial time and the protocol is perfect zero-knowledge. In the end of the section we will take care of the complications which arise when the protocol is statistical zero-knowledge and the simulator is expected polynomial time. Let us start by stating the theorem.
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Theorem 5.1: If L is recognized by a n i n teractive proof which is statistical zero-knowledge for a trusted veri er where the simulator runs in expected polynomial time then L can be recognized by a t wo round interactive proof.
Call the prover and veri er recognizing the language P 0 and V 0 and call the simulator M 0 . Recall that the probability of error in the protocol is at most 2 ;n and the number of rounds is d(n) where n is the length of the input. Run this protocol d(n) times in parallel and make the veri er accept if it accepts in a majority of the subprotocols. Call this new protocol P$V . Note that it is still perfect zero-knowledge for trusted veri er: the new simulator, M, just runs the old simulator d(n) times and takes majority. It is easy to show that the probability o f error for the new protocol is at most 2 ;cnd(n) for some c > 0. We will keep this value of c xed from now on. We denote the number of coins that V uses by l(n) and the numberofcoinsM uses by q(n).
Observe here that it is crucial that we are working with trusted veri er simulations since it is probably not true in general that running several zero-knowledge protocols in parallel will give a zero-knowledge protocol.
For the sake of the following two lemmas, assume that M always produces valid accepting conversations. Later we will discuss how t o modify the lemmas when this assumption is removed. Let Q(s) denote the probability that S appears as partial conversation in the conversation output by the simulator. Here S takes any of the values (s 2k;1 ) (s 2k;1 y) (s 2k;1 r ) and s 2k;1 y r ).
Using the notation of section 3 de ne F 0 = E(log j r j ; q(n)) and F k = E(log j s 2k;1 y r j ; log j s 2k;1 r j) = X s 2k;1 y r Q(s 2k;1 y r )(log j s 2k;1 y r j ; log j s 2k;1 r j):
where E is the expectation over a random partial conversation output by the simulator. Similarly de ne G 0 = ;l(n) and G k = E(log j s 2k;1 y j ; log j s 2k;1 j):
The intuition behind these de nitions is that F ; G is the expectation of the total amount o f cheating by P 0 on all its moves in a random conversation of the simulator. With these de nitions we c a n c haracterize the behavior of the simulator with the following two lemmas. Proofs: Lemma 5.2 follows clearly from the discussion in section 3 since when w 2 L, P 0 does not cheat and G k = F k for all k. To prove Lemma 5.3 we will rst establish the two facts described below.
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Fact 5.4: F = P s r Q(s r) l o g Q(s r) where, according to our previous conventions, the sum is only over conversations which h a ve a positive probability of being produced by the simulator.
This is a consequence of the de nitions since
Q(s r)(log j s 2k;1 y 2k r j ; log j s 2k;1 r j)) + X s r Q(s r)(log j r j ; q(n))
(log j s 2k;1 y 2k r j ; log j s 2k;1 r j) 1 A : ( ) Now since we have assumed that M always makes valid moves, it follows that j s 2k;1 y 2k r j = j s 2k;1 y 2k x r j where x is the unique move that V would make with coins r after the partial conversation s 2k;1 y 2k . Using this fact the above sum telescopes to log j s r j ; q(n) and this is precisely log Q(s r).
To get a similar formula for G let us examine the behavior of a new proverP which uses the output of the simulator to play against the veri er V . On partial conversation s 2k;1P makes the move y 2k with probability j s 2k;1 y 2k j=j s 2k;1 j which it can easily do since it is all powerful. If P r P $V = s r] is nonzero then it can be expanded as follows:
P r P plays y 2k jP$V = s 2k;1 and V has coins r ]:
By our previous comments the probability thatP plays y 2k given that s 2k;1 has been played so far is the same as the probability t h a t P plays y 2k given that s 2k;1 has been played so far and V has coins r for any r consistent with s 2k;1 . Let R(s r) = P r P $V = s r]. It follows that log R(s r) is equal to ;l(n) + d(n)=2 X k=1 (log j s 2k;1 y 2k j ; log j s 2k;1 j):
This establishes the following fact.
Fact 5.5: G = P s r Q(s r) l o g R(s r). Again, the sum is only over s r such t h a t Q(s r) > 0. Note here that whenever Q(s r) > 0 w e also have R(s r) > 0 and hence the given sum is nite.
Observe that when w = 2 L the probability that V accepts when interacting withP is at most 2 ;cnd(n) . Hence, the P R(s r) over s r with Q(s r) > 0 is at most 2 ;cnd(n) . Since F ; G = P Q(s r) log(Q(s r)=R(s r)) (over the appropriate s r) Lemma 5.3 follows from Lemma 5.6 below.
Lemma 5.6: Let P m i=1 p i = 1 and P m i=1 q i = q where p i > 0 and q i > 0 for all i, then P m i=1 p i log p i q i log 1 q . 11
Proof: (Lemma 5.6) Fix q i for all i. Let us minimize the expression over all values of p i satisfying P m i=1 p i = 1. The ith component of the gradient is log e(ln p i q i + 1 ) and thus the only interior extreme point is found for p i = q i =q for all i. This is easily checked to be the global minimum.
Before we continue, let us get rid of the assumption that M always produces valid accepting conversations. We will handle this by making B reject whenever he sees a conversation which is not valid or not accepting. We h a ve to analyze what e ect this has. Say that a conversation is OK if it is valid and accepting.
Fix t to be a polynomial. Suppose B picks jwjt(jwj) random R and runs M. If w 2 L then with probability 1 ;2 ;jwj jwjt(jwj) all these conversations will be accepting. Also all conversation will bevalid and that is enough to prove Lemma 5.2, and thus in this case there is no major di erence.
When w = 2 L there are two cases, either the fraction of OK conversations is at least 1 ;
or it is not. In the latter case B will except with exponentially small probability s e e a c o n versation which is not OK. In the former case the previous analysis is almost correct we just need a few minor changes. Fact 5.4 is no longer exactly true and we need a slight modi cation. In the sum ( ) let us distinguish two kinds of terms, namely the ones corresponding to s r which are OK conversations and the ones which are not OK. The rst kind of terms gives rise to a sum like the one in Fact 5.4 where the summation is limited to OK conversations. The other kind of terms gives a contribution which is at most O q(n) t(n) . Fact 5.5 remains valid but here it is also convenient to split the sum into terms corresponding to OK s r and conversations which not OK. This second sum is as beforebounded by O q(n) t(n) . On the other hand when we are summing over OK conversations we can use Lemma 5.6. Here we need the modi cation that the sum of Q(s r) o ver all OK conversations is slightly less than 1, but this again is an error term of size bounded by the same bound. Thus we obtain a weaker version of Lemma 5.3 with cnd(n) replaced by cnd(n) ; O q(n) t(n) . For t(n) q(n) w e can ignore the error term. Since B will see many more than q(n) conversations during the protocol and he will reject if he sees a conversation which is not OK we can assume throughout that Lemma 5.3 holds. Now we are ready to de ne the protocol for recognizing L. It will consist of subprotocols estimating upper bounds for F k and lower bounds for G k . On input w, jwj = n. Proof: To estimate the above probability w e look at exponential moments.
E(e (s ;
To estimate this quantity w e use After these preliminaries let us establish that the protocol is correct when w 2 L.
Lemma 5.9: If w 2 L then for su ciently large n the probability t h a t A can make B accept is 8 10
.
Proof: First observe that the probability that B sees a conversation which is not OK is exponentially small and hence for su ciently large n this is less than 1 10
We present a strategy for A that, given that B never sees a conversation which is not OK, will make B accept 9 times out of 10. Whenever A is supposed to prove an upper bound for the size 13 of a set whose true size is T, A states that the size of the set is at most 240q(n) . Whenever
Alice is successful in all these protocols B will get a value ofF k which is within 2 log(240q(n)
log j s (i) 2k;1 y r j ; log j s (i) 2k;1 r j . By Lemma 5.7 this implies that P r (F k 
By a similar argument w e get that P r (G k 
Thus with probability a t l e a s t 1 ; 4 d(n) the reverse inequalities hold for all k and since F = G we g e t by summing thatF ;Ĝ O(d(n) l o g q(n)d(n)) with this probability. Since log(q(n)d(n)) = o(n) this completes the proof of Lemma 5.9.
Next we establish that the protocol is correct also for w = 2 L.
Lemma 5.10: If w = 2 L then for su ciently large n the probability that A can make B accept is 1 10
Proof: As noted in the discussion before we de ned the protocol we can assume that most conversations are valid and accepting and hence that Lemma 5.3 is true.
For A to succeed in convincing B to accept with high probability either R (k) i must be favorable to A or A must claim lower (upper) bounds which are much larger (smaller) than the actual size of the sets. The former happens with very small probability and the latter will cause B to reject the lower (upper) bound protocol with high probability.
Suppose that A during the protocol claims a bound which is a factor 128 better than the true bound (this refers to either upper or lower bounds). Then the probability that A will get caught in trying to prove this bound is by Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 at least of succeeding in her upper and lower bounds proofs we h a vê F k F k ; 14 ; 4 l o g d(n) with probability 1 ; d(n) ;2 . ThusF F ; O(d(n) log d(n)) with probability at least 1 ; 1 d(n) . Similarly we getĜ G + O(d(n) log d(n)) with the same probability. If both these inequalities holdF ;Ĝ F ; G ; O(d(n) Lemmas 5.9 and 5.10 imply Theorem 5.1 in the case of perfect zero-knowledge and M being polynomial time. To see this we have only to verify that the protocol can be implemented in two rounds. However, by the result of Babai B] it is su cient to show that one can implement the protocol in a constant numberof rounds. But this is clear since we run all the subprotocols for di erent i and k in parallel.
Remark: Our constant round protocol for L and subsequent analysis are much more complicated than Fortnow's protocol for L. This is for a fundamental reason. In order for a prover, A, to convince a veri er, B, that x = 2 L, A need only show that the simulator occasionally cheats. A can simply show B a few partial conversations and prove that the simulator cheats on these. However, in order for A to convince B that x 2 L, A must convince B that the simulator is behaving honestly almost everywhere.
Not surprisingly, the present framework is general enough to prove Fortnow's result as well.
We modify our current protocol for recognizing L to get an ine cient protocol for recognizing L as follows. Change every lower (upper) bound subprotocol to a upper (lower) bound subprotocol.
The goal of the new prover is to show thatF ;Ĝ is large. The new veri er will accept when it is convinced that this is the case. The analysis for this new protocol is nearly identical to that described above.
This nishes the analysis for the cases where the simulator is polynomial time and perfect zero-knowledge. Let us see how t o take care of the complications that arise when the simulator is statistical zero-knowledge.
Statistical zero-knowledge. For statistical zero-knowledge the same protocol will work. Even the analysis for w = 2 L is the same since the zero-knowledge constraint on the behavior of the simulator only applies to w 2 L. However, when w 2 L the analysis does need a slight modi cation. It is no longer true that G = F since P 0 no longer behaves exactly like P. However, the di erence is small and can be taken care of as follows. Let T(S) denote the probability that S appears as a partial conversation in a conversation between V and P. De ne F k = E (log (T (s 2k;1 y r )) ; log (T (s 2k;1 r ))) and G k = E (log (T (s 2k;1 y)) ; log (T (s 2k;1 ))) Where the expected value is taken with respect to random s 2k;1 y and r produced by P and V . It is clear that F k = G k .
Writing everything explicitly we h a ve F k = 2 ;q(n) X s 2k;1 y r j s 2k;1 y r j(log j s 2k;1 y r j ; log j s 2k;1 r j) and F k = X s 2k;1 y r T(s 2k;1 y r ) (log (T (s 2k;1 y r )) ; log (T (s 2k;1 r ))) :
We know that P s 2k;1 y r j2 ;q(n) j s 2k;1 y r j ; T(s 2k;1 y r )j 1 t(n) for any polynomial t. Since the derivative o f p log p is log p + log e this implies that jF k ; F k j o q(n) t(n) for any polynomial t. We get the same result for jG k ; G k j and thus jG ; Fj o Expected polynomial time simulator. Suppose M runs in expected time q(n). The number of coins that M uses is potentially unlimited. Hence, we d o n o t h a ve w ell de ned nite sets of the simulator's coins on which to run our upper and lower bound subprotocols. We can take care of this problem as follows.
Rede ne F k to be E(log P r y 2k = yjs 2k;1 r ]) and similarly let G k = E(log P r y 2k = yjs 2k;1 ]). These de nitions agree with the old de nitions in the case when M is polynomial time. For any partial conversation S rede ne S to be the set of coins of length 10q(n) such that given these coins M halts within time 10q(n) and produces the partial conversation S. Observe that with this de nition the new de nitions of F k and G k no longer agree with the old de nitions.
The protocol is now the same as before having A prove bounds for the -sets with the new de nitions. When B picks a random R there is the possibility that M will not halt. In this case B will just pick another R and try again. If B fails n times consecutive l y i t g i v es up and rejects the input.
B will reject for this reason with exponentially small probability since the probability of M halting within time 10q(n) is at least 9/10. Thus this will not change the performance of the protocol.
The intuition behind the protocol also working when using the modi ed sets is that j S j 2 10q(n) is a fairly good approximation for the probability that the partial conversation S appears. Before we analyzed all other aspects of the protocol when 2 ;10q(n) S is equal to this probability we need now just analyze the additional problems that appear from this intuition not being exactly correct.
Let Q(S) be the probability that M outputs the partial conversation S. Thus the intuition we need to verify is that this is close to 2 ;10q(n) j S j. Observe that we a l w ays have Q(S) 2 ;10q(n) j S j. We need to prove that A can do almost as well as before when w 2 L and not too much better than before when w = 2 L. Let us start by the former. Alice will not do as well when she cannot prove good upper bounds on Q(s 2k;1 y r ) and Q(s 2k;1 ) or when she cannot prove goodlower bounds on Q(s 2k;1 r ) and Q(s 2k;1 y). Since the sizes of the sets can only be smaller than they should be, Alice will always do as we l l i n p r o ving upper bounds as she did before. For the lower bounds we claim that with probability a t m o s t 10 9D B will pick a n R which g i v es rise to s 2k;1 y which satis es j s 2k;1 y j D ;1 2 10q(n) Q(s 2k;1 y) ( ):
The reason for this is that if we let P 0 denote the sum over all s 2k;1 y satisfying ( ) then B will never choose a R (k) i satisfying ( ). But in such a case A will be able to getĜ andF within O(d(n) log(q(n)d(n))) of the values she can get when M is polynomial time. Thus Lemma 5.9 also follows in the case of expected polynomial time.
Now consider the case when w = 2 L. We have to establish that A cannot do too much better than before. This would happen if she could prove better upper bounds for Q(s 2k;1 y r ) and Q(s 2k;1 ) or if she could prove better lower boundsfor Q(s 2k;1 r ) and Q(s 2k;1 y). The second possibility can never occur and for the rst possibility w e get the same analysis as above.
